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Abstract
We study a dynamic model of opinion formation in social networks. In our
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on the long-run group opinion is increasing in network centrality and decreasing
in conformity. Concerning efficiency of information aggregation or “wisdom” of the
society, it turns out that misrepresentation of opinions need not undermine wisdom,
but may even enhance it. Given the network, we provide the optimal distribution of
conformity levels in the society and show which agents should be more conforming
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Introduction

Opinions crucially shape individual behavior and affect economic decisions and outcomes.1
For instance, opinions on political issues set the political course, opinions about a product’s quality and the integrity of its producer influence demand, and opinions about
an economy’s growth determine investment decisions. The formation and evolution of
opinions are often carried by day-to-day interactions of individuals, i.e. the opinions are
determined by exchange in a social network.
We model the formation of opinions through communication in a given social network
such that individuals are influenced by the opinions stated by others: individuals update
their opinion in a naı̈ve way by taking a weighted average of others’ stated opinions
(as in the literature on naı̈ve learning, see e.g. DeGroot, 1974; DeMarzo et al., 2003;
Golub and Jackson, 2010; Acemoglu et al., 2010). However, influence often goes beyond
this simple updating of opinions. When asked for a personal opinion, people usually do
not straightforwardly state what they truly think, rather they are tempted to misrepresent
their opinion to conform to their friends since disagreement entails discomfortable feelings
(see Zafar, 2011, for empirical evidence). In this paper, we consequently allow that not
only the own opinion is influenced by what others say, but also the statement itself. In
other words, some individuals tweak their stated opinions to conform to what their social
contacts say.
In such a framework, we study the dynamics of opinions and particularly focus on
the long-run distribution of opinions in the society. We show that under mild conditions
dynamics converge and subgroups of the society reach a consensus. Moreover, we obtain a
closed-form solution for long-run influence (opinion leadership): an individual’s influence
on consensus is increasing in her network centrality (as in DeMarzo et al., 2003), but
decreasing in her degree of conformity. This result, hence, explains the empirical finding
that opinion leaders are often characterized by low conformity.2 When interpreting initial
opinions as signals about some true state of nature, the quality of information aggregation
(wisdom) can be assessed by the precision of the consensus belief. We show in this paper
that information does not necessarily get distorted when individuals are conforming. In
fact, the society may be quite wise compared to the case where nobody misrepresents. The
reason is that opinion leaders (as characterized before) are not necessarily well-informed,
i.e. may not receive the best signal. To avoid that these powerful agents mislead the
society and to benefit the quality of information aggregation, these opinion leaders should
1

Under the term opinions we subsume also beliefs, judgments, and estimations – depending on the
application.
2
A personality trait that has been found to discriminate opinion leaders from followers is called ‘public
individuation’ (Chan and Misra, 1990). It measures by a list of questions the extent to which “people
choose to act differently than others” (Maslach et al., 1985).
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conform more to the society. Depending on the network structure and the quality of
the signals, we characterize the set of optimal distributions of conformity to maximize
wisdom.
We allow for conformity in an opinion formation framework since there is substantial
empirical evidence that individuals conform to the actions of others when these actions
are observable (as stated opinions are). For instance in the famous study by Asch (1955),
subjects wrongly judged the length of a line after other participants of the experiment
(conceived as neutral by the subjects, but being collaborators) had placed the same wrong
judgment. Follow-up studies revealed that this effect is weaker if the subjects do not have
to report their judgments publicly (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955). In the study by Asch
(1955), subjects were asked for the reasons of their wrong judgment. Some said they were
convinced of the wrong answer by the collaborators; others said that they knew that their
answer was wrong, but felt uncomfortable by not conforming to what the collaborators
said (see Asch, 1955, p.21). Deutsch and Gerard (1955), hence, distinguish two forms of
social influence that can be observed in this study. While informational social influence
describes the updating of (true) opinions according to what others have said, normative
social influence describes the behavior of stating an opinion that fits the group norm.3
Normative social influence is also documented with respect to other publicly observable behavior. In an experiment on charitable giving, Zafar (2011) shows that individuals
adjust more to the contributions of their neighbors (and hence conform more by reducing
respectively increasing their contribution), the more their donations are observable, supporting the findings by Asch (1955) and Deutsch and Gerard (1955). Moreover, subjects
in Zafar’s experiment mainly conform to the actions of participants who are their friends
outside the lab. Hence, normative social influence is determined by the social network
itself. Zafar (2011) concludes that individuals experience “a utility gain by simply making
the same choice as [their] reference group” (Zafar, 2011, p. 774). Incentives to conform
can be derived from desires for social status (Bernheim, 1994) and are embodied in a
utility component that depends on the difference of the behavior of the focal actor and
the behavior of some peer group (Jones, 1984).
While normative social influence affects the choice of stated opinions, informational
social influence embodies the updating of the true opinions. We assume that individuals update their true opinions naı̈vely rather than sophistically since empirical evidence
strongly suggests that individuals in these settings behave boundedly rational (Corazzini
et al., 2012; Grimm and Mengel, 2013; Battiston and Stanca, 2014). If individuals were
3

Deutsch and Gerard (1955, p. 629) further explain: “Commonly these two types of influence are
found together. However, it is possible to conform behaviorally with the expectations of others and say
things which one disbelieves but which agree with the beliefs of others. Also, it is possible that one will
accept an opponent’s beliefs as evidence about reality even though one has no motivation to agree with
him, per se.”
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fully rational, they would perfectly account for repetition of information (for some references on Bayesian learning in opinion formation, see Gale and Kariv, 2003; Acemoglu
et al., 2011; Mueller-Frank, 2013). This, however, requires knowledge of the social network (personal relationships, individual trust in one another). Moreover, under Bayesian
learning, the social network plays no role for the long-run outcome since individuals are
able to derive the initial signals and thus to extract all information perfectly,4 which is a
rather unrealistic assumption. In fact, evidence from laboratory experiments shows that
even in small social networks (of only four people) where the network is made common
knowledge, people fail to properly account for repetitions of information (Corazzini et al.,
2012; Battiston and Stanca, 2014). Making the network structure more complex, Grimm
and Mengel (2013) also confirm that learning in the lab is very well approximated by the
naı̈ve learning approach.
Hence, we model informational social influence by assuming that individuals learn
naı̈vely from what others say (see also DeMarzo et al., 2003; Golub and Jackson, 2010;
Acemoglu et al., 2010). In view of the substantial empirical evidence, we enrich the
naı̈ve learning model by studying the effects of individuals who have a desire to adjust
their behavior (i.e. their stated opinion) to the behavior of their friends (i.e. their friends’
stated opinions). In the words of psychology, this corresponds to modeling normative
social influence. Remarkably, this type of influence has not been studied in a theoretical
model of opinion dynamics despite the large empirical evidence.5 The main conceptual
contribution of this work is hence to fill this gap by studying a model incorporating
both informational and normative social influence. We focus on two motives for the
misrepresentation of opinions: conformity and counter-conformity, while we also allow for
honest agents.6 The desire to relate own stated opinions to the stated opinions of friends is
given by an additional utility component parameterized by a preference parameter which
we call the agents’ degree of conformity. If positive, agents are of conforming type and
state an opinion which is a convex combination of their own true opinion and other agents’
stated opinions. If negative, an agent is counter-conforming and will state a more extreme
opinion and if zero, an agent is honest, i.e. behaving like agents in the standard DeGroot
4

Indeed, among equally informed agents with a strongly connected communication structure that is
common knowledge, Bayesian updating leads to convergence of each opinion to the average of the initial
opinions (DeMarzo et al., 2003, theorem 3).
5
Meanwhile, the concepts of informational and normative social influence have become a cornerstone in
analyzing social influence, e.g. Ariely and Levav (2000, p. 279) call it the “primary paradigm”. However,
this paradigm did not explicitly enter economic models. The terms ‘social influence’ and ‘conformity’
do usually not clarify whether social or normative influence is at work. We will be more explicit on
this distinction and only refer to conformity as a form of normative social influence. In terms of this
paradigm, the DeGroot model of opinion formation and its variations are models of informational social
influence, but not of normative social influence.
6
This is consistent with the psychological theory where identification, non-identification and disidentification lead to these three types of normative social influence (Hogg and Abrams, 1988).
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model.
When opinions are exchanged and updated repeatedly, we show that if agents are
honest or of conforming type, the dynamics converge to a steady state.7 In contrast,
counter-conformity may lead to divergence of opinions which we exemplify in the case
of only two agents. This type of divergence is caused by agents stating more and more
extreme opinions implying cycling dynamics, a feature we do not observe in the DeGroot
model.
If agents in a subgroup find a consensus, the immediate question emerges how much
this consensus is influenced by each agent’s initial opinion.8 Each individual’s influence on
the long–run, hence, defines a measure of opinion leadership. As one of the main results,
we show how opinion leadership or power is determined not only by each individual’s
position in the network, given by eigenvector centrality (Bonacich, 1972; Friedkin, 1991),
but also by the distribution of conformity in the society. Comparative statics reveal that
an agent’s power is decreasing in own level of conformity, increasing in other agents’ level
of conformity and increasing in own network centrality.
Finally, we consider a context where there is a true state of nature and the individuals’
initial opinions are unbiased noisy signals which may differ with respect to signal precision
(the inverse of the variance). The question is how the misrepresentation of opinions affects
the accuracy of information aggregation (the society’s wisdom). A negative effect might
be expected since stated opinions may become even less reliable signals about the truth.
Our results show that this conjecture does not hold in general. First, if the society is
homogeneous with respect to conformity, then information aggregation is neither worse
nor better than in the DeGroot model (i.e. when all individuals are honest). Moreover,
heterogeneous levels of conformity foster wisdom if they balance the power of agents
with their signal precision, while an unbalanced distribution can lead to lower wisdom.
Using comparative statics we observe that for the goal of higher accuracy of the consensus
opinion, it would be helpful if people with a low signal precision (relative to their power)
were more conforming, while people with a high signal precision (relative to their power)
should be less conforming, or in more poetic words: “The whole problem with the world
is that fools and fanatics are always so certain of themselves, but wiser people so full of
doubts.”9
7

As in the classic DeGroot model, steady states feature consensus in closed and strongly connected
subgroups.
8
This research question is also motivated by empirical research on identifying opinion leaders, which
started with Katz and Lazarsfeld (2005).
9
Credit for this quote is often given to Bertrand Russell although the origin of the quote is actually
unknown. It is at least confirmed that Russell made a similar statement in his essay “The Triumph of
Stupidity” (10 May 1933), which can be found on pp. 203-204 in the collection of essays “Mortals and
Others”.

5
Published by Berkeley Electronic Press Services, 2014

5

Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Papers, Art. 914 [2014]

Related Models There is a growing body of literature that studies naı̈ve learning in social networks. DeMarzo et al. (2003) introduce this approach into the economics literature
arguing that people are often unable to properly account for repetition of information.
The underlying assumption of a “persuasion bias” is helpful to understand different empirical phenomena such as the importance of airtime in political discussions and it has
also found empirical support in the laboratory (Corazzini et al., 2012; Grimm and Mengel,
2013; Battiston and Stanca, 2014). Among naı̈ve agents the social network becomes vital
in the sense that not only accuracy of information but also network centrality determines
an agent’s influence on her group (DeMarzo et al., 2003). This form of social influence
makes naı̈ve agents prone to be misled by powerful actors such as community leaders or
lobbyists (Acemoglu et al., 2010). On the other hand, dispersed pieces of information
can also be efficiently aggregated among naı̈ve agents if the influence of each individual
is vanishingly small (Golub and Jackson, 2010). The crucial question is hence under
which conditions exchange of opinions among naı̈ve agents leads to efficient information
aggregation which is also called wisdom (Golub and Jackson, 2010). Our model takes the
examination of the questions of power and wisdom to a further level since it incorporates
not only the social network structure but also individual degrees of conformity.
The modeling approach of the above literature roots in the pioneer work of French
(1956), Harary (1959), DeGroot (1974) and Friedkin and Johnsen (1990).10 One variation
of the naı̈ve learning approach is to let agents only be affected by opinions that are not too
different from the own opinion (Hegselmann and Krause, 2002). Moreover, DeMarzo et al.
(2003) allow the self-confidence to vary over time, while Lorenz (2005) allows the whole
learning matrix to vary and identifies general conditions for convergence. Under some
conditions, convergence to consensus is also robust if updating is noisy, as Mueller-Frank
(2011) shows. There are also studies which extend the model by DeGroot (1974) to allow
for adaption of learning weights, e.g. in Pan (2010) the influence weights are updated
over time and Flache and Torenvlied (2004) study a variation of the classic model where
actors anticipate the difference between own opinion and group decision (“frustration”)
and adapt learning weights (“salience”) accordingly. The case where agents are able to
manipulate learning weights of others is studied in Foerster et al. (2013). The focus of
many of these models is to provide conditions for convergence, or determine opinion leadership. We contribute to this literature by allowing agents to misrepresent their opinion
and study the effect on convergence conditions and opinion leadership. In a context of
cultural transmission of traits, Buechel et al. (2011) introduce strategic interaction for the
DeGroot model in an OLG framework. While this resembles counter-conforming misrepresentation of opinions, their model differs with respect to the optimization problem of
individuals, the updating rule, and the resulting dynamics.
10

We adopt their assumptions on naı̈ve learning to model informational social influence.

6
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper914

6

Buechel et al.: Opinion Dynamics and Wisdom under Conformity

Besides these highly related works, there are several contributions to somewhat similar
research questions, but with respect to different settings. While their discussion is beyond
the scope of this paper, we refer the reader to the following few prominent examples:
other models of social learning (Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Ellison and Fudenberg, 1993,
1995; Bala and Goyal, 1998, 2001), cooperative models of social influence (Grabisch and
Rusinowska, 2010, 2011), a model of strategic influence (Galeotti and Goyal, 2009), a
model on rumors (Merlone and Radi, 2014) and a framework which contains strategic
misrepresentation of opinions under Bayesian learning as a special case (Rosenberg et al.,
2009). Most of these models investigate social influence on a discrete choice of actions,
such as the choice of one out of two technologies, as opposed to continuous opinions.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the
model. Before we present the main results (in Section 4), we discuss the two-player case
(Section 3). Section 5 addresses the wisdom of the society and in Section 6 we conclude,
while proofs are relegated to the appendix.

2
2.1

Model
Informational Social Influence

There is a set of agents/players N = {1, 2, ..., n} who interact with each other. A learning
structure is given by a n × n row stochastic matrix G, i.e. gij ≥ 0 for all i, j ∈ N and
Pn
j=1 gij = 1 for all i ∈ N . This learning matrix represents the extent to which agents
listen to other agents and it can be interpreted as a weighted and directed social network.
We say that there is a directed path from i to j in this network if there exists i0 , ..., ik ∈ N
such that i0 = i and ik = j and gil il+1 > 0 for all l = 0, ..., k − 1, which is equivalent to
(Gk )ij > 0.11 Moreover, we assume that gii < 1 for all i to assure that all agents update
their opinion.
We study a dynamic model where time is discrete t = 0, 1, 2... and initially each agent
has a predefined opinion xi (0) concerning some topic. The opinions of all agents at time
t are collected in x(t) ∈ Rn . In every period, agents talk to each other and finally update
their opinions according to the matrix G. In the classical DeGroot model agents exchange
opinions such that the opinions in period t + 1 are formed by x(t + 1) = Gx(t) = Gt+1 x(0)
(DeGroot, 1974). The motivation for such a model is that agents always report their
true opinions and suffer from persuasion bias when the next period’s opinion is formed
as a weighted average of own and others’ opinions according to the social network G.
11

We follow the convention of Jackson (2008) and DeMarzo et al. (2003) that a directed link from agent
i to agent j indicates that i listens to j, i.e. gij > 0, while the opposite convention is used by Corazzini
et al. (2012).
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Concerning the assumption of honesty in opinion formation, DeMarzo et al. (2003) note:
“For simplicity, we assume that agents report their beliefs truthfully.”12
We relax this assumption: an agent i ∈ N expresses some opinion si (t) ∈ R which need
not coincide with her true opinion xi (t).13
A central assumption of our approach is that an agent cannot observe the true opinions
of the others but only their stated opinions. Since each agent knows her own true opinion
xi (t), we get that agent i0 s next period’s opinion is formed by xi (t + 1) = gii xi (t) +
P
j6=i gij sj (t), where the weights gij are the individual learning weights as in the classical
model by DeGroot (1974). This holds for all agents i ∈ N and, thus, the updating process
becomes
x(t + 1) = Dx(t) + (G − D)s(t),
(1)
where D is the n × n diagonal matrix containing the diagonal of G.

2.2

Normative Social Influence

Misrepresenting the own opinion (i.e. being dishonest) might cause discomfort (e.g. Festinger, 1957). However, there are various motives to misrepresent the own opinion. Not
only strategic considerations of persuasion play a role, but also personality traits or emotional motives. There is ample evidence that many people feel discomfort from stating an
opinion that is different from their peer group’s opinion (e.g. Deutsch and Gerard, 1955).
While certainly many people feel this type of normative social influence, this need not
be true for all people – there are even some who prefer to state an opinion that is far
away from what others say.14 We focus on these two motives for the misrepresentation of
opinions: conformity and counter-conformity.
To formalize these ideas, consider an agent i who is confronted with some group opinion
qi , while her own opinion on this topic is xi . In the spirit of the model of Bernheim (1994)
we consider a utility function that depends on an intrinsic part – this will be the incentive
to be honest – and a social part – this will be the incentive to conform/counter-conform.
Additionally, we assume that utility of an agent is additively separable into these two
parts and that for each part disutility takes a quadratic form.
12

DeMarzo et al. (2003, p. 3, footnote 9).
The incentive to state an opinion different from true opinion will be based on preferences for conformity or counter-conformity (cf. Subection 2.2). Moreover, agents adapt their stated opinions faster than
true opinions such that s(t) is given by Proposition 1.
14
For instance, Hornsey et al. (2003) conducted a laboratory experiment where subjects reported their
willingness to privately or publicly express and support their opinion. For subjects with a strong moral
basis on the topic, the treatment of suggesting that a majority of the other subjects disagreed slightly
increased the willingness to publicly express the opinion.
13

8
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Thus, the utility of agent i depends on the distance of true opinion xi to stated opinion
si as well as on the distance of stated opinion si to group opinion qi in the following way:
ui (si |xi ) := −(1 − δi ) si − xi

2

2
− δi s i − q i ,

(2)

where δi ∈ (−1, +1) displays the relative importance of the preference for conformity in
relation to the preference for honesty. The preference peak (or “bliss point,” Bernheim,
1994) for such an agent is given by si = (1 − δi )xi (t) + δi qi (t). This assumption is
illustrated in Figure 1. For δi ∈ (0, 1) the agent faces a trade-off between conforming and
being honest such that her preference peak lies within the interval (xi , qi ). For δi ∈ (−1, 0),
a similar trade-off can be seen between counter-conforming and being honest. In that case
the preference peak lies within the interval (xi − (qi − xi ), xi ). We assume that δi > −1
to restrict counter-conformity to a certain bound which seems weak enough to cover all
reasonable cases, but keeps the analysis tractable.

Figure 1: Preferences for conformity, counter-conformity, and honesty.

A stylized fact on normative social influence is that people are heterogeneous in the way
and their degree of being influenced. The degree of conformity can hence be considered a
personality trait, but it might also depend on the topic under discussion. Let ∆ denote
the n × n diagonal matrix with entries δi ∈ (−1, 1) on the diagonal representing the levels
of conformity in the society.
Now, we want to determine each agents’ stated opinion without assuming that the
network structure and the individual types are common knowledge and without assuming
that agents are sophisticated in anticipating the consequences of their behavior. For this
purpose we consider an adaption process of stated opinions which takes place within a
time period t, while true opinions are updated from one period to the next.15 Thus,
suppose that within each period t ∈ N, there is a fast time scale τ ∈ N such that at
each time step τ one or more agents speak. The (possibly random) set of agents who are
selected to state their opinions at time step τ (of period t) is denoted by Aτ (t). Let sτ (t)
be the vector of stated opinions. Agents who are not selected to revise keep the stated
opinion of the previous time step, i.e. sτi (t) = sτi −1 (t) if i ∈ N \ Aτ (t). Agents, who are
15

An interpretation for this assumption is that each period is a discussion round within which stated
opinions are adjusted, while learning takes place between discussion rounds.
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selected to speak and thereby revise their stated opinion, observe last time step’s stated
opinions of their neighbors. These are perceived as a reference opinion qiτ −1 (t), which is
the average of the stated opinions with weights according to the listening matrix G, i.e.
qiτ (t) =

X
j6=i

gij τ
s (t).
1 − gii j

(3)

In line with our assumption that agents are naı̈ve when updating, we also assume that
agents are boundedly rational when revising their stated opinions. Upon revision opportunity, i.e. i ∈ Aτ (t), an agent i myopically chooses a stated opinion which maximizes her
current utility given by (2), i.e.
sτi (t) = (1 − δi )xi (t) + δi qiτ −1 (t),

(4)

for any true opinion xi (t) and any reference opinion qiτ −1 (t).16 Hence, the stated opinion
given by myopic best response differs from the true opinion proportionally to the difference
of reference opinion and true opinion, and the proportion is determined by the preference
parameter δi . The parameter δi can thus be directly interpreted as the degree of conformity
of agent i0 s behavior (cf. Figure 1). A conforming agent, characterized by δi ∈ (0, 1),
states an opinion between the true opinion xi (t) and perceived opinion qiτ −1 (t). A counterconforming agent, characterized by δi ∈ (−1, 0), states an opinion that is more extreme
than the true opinion xi (t) (with respect to the perceived opinion qiτ −1 (t)). Finally, an
honest agent, characterized by δi = 0, straight-forwardly states the true opinion, i.e.
sτi (t) = xi (t) for all τ ∈ N.
To ensure that every agent takes part in opinion exchange in period t, we assume that
for each agent i, the set {τ ∈ N : i ∈ Aτ (t)} is (almost surely) infinite, reflecting the
idea that no agent will stay forever with a stated opinion that is not in line with her
preferences. This assumption is satisfied if, e.g., at each time step τ agents are randomly
selected to speak according to some probability distribution with full support on N .
It turns out that such a myopic best reply process within period t ∈ N inevitably leads
to one specific profile of stated opinions s(t) which only depends on the network G and
the conformity parameters ∆, but not on the starting stated opinions s0 (t).
Proposition 1. Given the assumptions above, the within-period dynamics sτ (t) converge
for τ → ∞ to
s(t) := [I − ∆(I − D)−1 (G − D)]−1 (I − ∆)x(t).
(5)
The proof of Proposition 1 as well as all proofs of the following propositions are relegated to an appendix. Proposition 1 shows that agents who revise opinions by conforming
16

Myopic maximizing is a common assumption in such models (see, e.g. Corazzini et al., 2012).
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or counter-conforming to what their neighbors last said, finally state (or express) the opinions given by (5).
It is worth noting that considering the action sets Si (t) = R and utility functions
ui (si (t)|xi (t)) given by (2) implies that s(t) obtained by Proposition 1 is the unique Nash
equilibrium of the normal form game (N , S(t), u(·|x(t)) for each t ∈ N. Note that the
process that leads into this Nash equilibrium within period t neither requires complete
information (e.g. on the network structure G), nor high degrees of rationality, nor some
sort of common knowledge.

2.3

Model Summary

In our model each period t ∈ N can be viewed as a discussion round within which agents
express opinions and then learn from one discussion round to the next. Proposition 1
determines which opinions are finally stated in a given period as a function of the true
opinions x(t). These stated opinions s(t) determine the vector of reference opinions q(t)
by (3) and are then a crucial ingredient of the updating process.17 Since opinions of period
t + 1 are formed by (1) and the stated opinions of each period can be calculated as in
Proposition 1, we conclude that the opinion profile in period t + 1 depends on the opinion
profile in period t in the following way:
x(t + 1) = M x(t),

(6)

h
i
where M := D+(G−D)[I −∆(I −D)−1 (G−D)]−1 (I −∆) . Note that the transformation
from x(t) to x(t+1), i.e. the matrix M , is independent of x(t). Thus, the opinion dynamics
are fully described by the power series M t , since x(t + 1) = M x(t) = M 2 x(t − 1) =
... = M t+1 x(0).18 The relation to the classical DeGroot model becomes apparent in this
expression when recalling x(t+1) = Gx(t) = Gt+1 x(0). In that light the misrepresentation
of opinions leads to a transformation of the matrix G into the matrix M . If every agent
is honest, i.e. δi = 0 for any i ∈ N , then M = G and, hence, we are back in the standard
case of DeGroot (1974).
Before we analyze this model in full generality in Section 4, we derive and illustrate
its properties for the case of two agents in Section 3.
17

Since one interpretation for qi (t) is that this is the society’s opinion at time t as perceived by agent
i, we also call it i0 s perceived opinion.
18
The simple linear structure is of course implied by our assumption of quadratic utility.
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3

Two-Agent Case

In this case, closed form solutions are easy to obtain and, still, it is possible to observe
several important properties of the opinion dynamics.
Let n = 2. Then we can write G as
!
1 − g12
g12
G=
g21
1 − g21
with g12 , g21 ∈ (0, 1). With only two agents, the relevant group average for one agent is
simply the stated opinion of the other agent, i.e. q1 (t) = s2 (t) and q2 (t) = s1 (t). Plugging
in the variables for G into (6) yields

1 − δ2
1 − δ2
g12
1 − g12 1 − δ1 δ2
1 − δ1 δ2 
.

=
1 − δ1 
1 − δ1
1 − g21
g21
1 − δ1 δ2
1 − δ1 δ2


M=

1 − m12
m12
m21
1 − m21

!

Since x(t + 1) = M x(t), an entry mij gives the importance of Player j on the one-period
1−δ1
12
= −g12 (1−δ
opinion change of Player i. From ∂m
2 , we see the following comparative
∂δ2
1 δ2 )
static effect: higher conformity of Player 2 reduces her one-period influence on Player 1
(m12 ), which vanishes (m12 → 0) when Player 2’s conformity approaches 1. Thus, in the
short run, conformity results in a reduction of influence. To investigate long-run effects,
we examine the power series M t since x(t) = M t x(0). By induction one can easily see
that M t can be rewritten as follows:
!
m21 + m12 (1 − m12 − m21 )t m12 − m12 (1 − m12 − m21 )t
1
t
.
(7)
M =
m12 + m21 m21 − m21 (1 − m12 − m21 )t m12 + m21 (1 − m12 − m21 )t
From (7), we observe that the decisive quantity for the (speed of) convergence of M t is
λ := 1 − m12 − m21 = 1 −

g12 (1 − δ2 ) + g21 (1 − δ1 )
< 1,
1 − δ1 δ2

which is the second (largest) eigenvalue of M (the other eigenvalue of M is always 1). In
particular, M t converges if |λ| < 1 and, moreover, the smaller |λ|, the higher the speed of
convergence. Before discussing the issue of convergence in more detail, let us have a brief
look at the limit of M t in case of convergence: with the help of (7), we have
m21
m + m
= lim M t =  12m 21
21
t→∞
m12 + m21


M∞


m12
m12 + m21 

m12
m12 + m21
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such that, in the long run, the two agents will reach a consensus because x(∞) = M ∞ x(0).
21
Player 1’s and Player 2’s initial opinions enter this consensus opinion with weights m12m+m
21
g12 (1−δ2 )
g21 (1−δ1 )
m12
12
and m12m+m
,
respectively.
Since
=
=
1
−
,
m12 +m21
g12 (1−δ2 )+g21 (1−δ1 )
g12 (1−δ2 )+g21 (1−δ1 )
21
Player 2’s influence in the long run is decreasing in δ2 . Therefore, increasing conformity
not only decreases the short-run importance of an agent, but also the long-term impact
of this agent’s initial opinion.
To study the effect of conformity/counter-conformity on convergence, we will first
consider the special case δ1 = δ2 =: δ which simplifies λ to
λ=1−

1
(g12 + g21 ).19
1+δ

(8)

Since λ < 1, the decisive thresholds for λ are λ = 0 and λ = −1: for λ = 0, convergence
will be fastest (one-step convergence due to M = M 2 = ... = M ∞ ), while λ = −1 marks
the case of cycling M t (M t will alternate between M 1 = M 3 = ... and M 2 = M 4 !
= ...).
0.6 0.4
Figure 2 exemplifies the corresponding across-period dynamics for G =
and
0.2 0.8
initial opinions x(0) = (0, 100)0 . For better readability, we abstract from within-period
dynamics and simply connect the opinions at time t and t + 1 by straight lines in this
and the following figures. Notice, in particular, that the speed of convergence of true
opinions x(t) is not monotone in δ: when δ decreases from 0.5 to −0.4, speed increases and
eventually reaches one-step convergence; however, further reducing δ first leads to slower,
alternating dynamics, cycling, and finally divergent behavior.20 It might be surprising
that higher levels of conformity can decrease the speed of convergence. The intuition for
this effect can be gained by comparing cases (a) and (b). Under conformity, i.e. in case
(a), stated opinions s(t) are closer to each other in the first time periods such that agents’
true opinions x(t) are less swayed to the center compared with case (b) where agents are
honest.21
If we relax the assumption of equal conformity (δ1 = δ2 ), the necessary and sufficient
condition for convergence of M t (λ > −1) is equivalent to
g12

1 − δ1
1 − δ2
+ g21
< 2.
1 − δ1 δ2
1 − δ1 δ2

(9)

To interpret this condition in terms of individual conformity parameters, let us distin19

λ and |λ| as a function of δ are depicted in part (0) of Figure 2.
Another aspect that can be observed in Figure 2 is that, under convergence, i.e. in cases (a)-(e), the
dynamics converge to the same limit independently of δ. We will show later on that this observation is
not a coincidence and that it is induced by setting δ1 = δ2 = δ.
21
Recall that agents know their own true opinion and are thus resistant against their own misrepresentation.
20
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Figure 2: Seven cases of two-agent dynamics for δ1 = δ2 = δ. Solid lines represent true
opinions and dashed lines display stated opinions. (0) Shape of λ. (a) δ > 0, conformity.
(b) δ = 0, honesty. (c) −0.4 < δ < 0, smooth convergence under counter-conformity. (d)
δ = −0.4, one-step convergence. (e) δ < −0.4, alternating dynamics with convergence.
(f) δ = −0.7, alternating dynamics (λ = −1). (g) δ < −0.7, divergence.
guish two cases:22
g12 (1−δ2 )+g21 −2
.
g21 −2δ2

(i) If δ2 ≤

2g21 +g12 −2
,
2+g12

then M t converges if and only if δ1 >

(ii) If δ2 >

2g21 +g12 −2
,
2+g12

then M t converges for any δ1 ∈ (−1, +1).

Thus, if Player 2 has a relatively low degree of conformity (case (i)), then Player 1 must be
sufficiently conforming in order to assure convergence. However, if Player 2’s conformity is
above some threshold, then we will have convergence for any conformity level of Player 1.
In fact, δ2 > 13 is sufficient for (ii) to hold. Since similar arguments can be made by
exchanging the players’ labels, in the two-agent case we always have convergence if there
It can be checked that the threshold which defines the two cases is always in (−1, 13 ). Additionally,
given that (i) holds, the threshold for δ1 is below 1.
22
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is an agent with δi > 31 . Thus, a sufficiently conforming agent will reach consensus with
any other agent.

4

Opinion Dynamics

To study the dynamics of opinions for an arbitrary number of agents, we first elaborate
on conditions of convergence and then determine where opinions converge to.

4.1

Convergence

By convergence, we mean that opinions settle down in a steady state, but not necessarily
that a consensus in the society is reached. In the standard DeGroot model, convergence of
opinions is obtained under very mild conditions, which basically exclude cycling dynamics
(Golub and Jackson, 2010). In our more general model, opinions may not only converge
or cycle, but also diverge, as shown in the case of two agents with the same level of
(counter-)conformity (cf. Figure 2). The two-agent case nurtures the intuition that among
conforming agents opinions always approach each other, while among counter-conforming
agents opinions may alternate and eventually diverge. Mathematically, convergence of
opinions is driven by convergence of M t .23 Counter-conforming agents can lead to negative
entries of matrix M which may but need not make M t divergent.24 Reversely, honest and
conforming agents do not induce negative entries of M such that convergence can be
guaranteed by standard results. This yields the following simple condition that ensures
convergence of opinion dynamics for any vector of starting opinions x(0).
Proposition 2 (First Convergence Result). M t converges for t → ∞ if for all i ∈ N we
have gii > 0 and δi ≥ 0.
The condition presented here is fairly weak. If we exclude counter-conformity (δi ≥ 0),
and every individual has at least some self-confidence, then the opinion dynamics converge.
The assumption of positive self-confidence thereby only serves to assure aperiodicity of
matrix M which could also be generated by weaker assumptions. Although all cases of
conformity are covered by Proposition 2, it is important to emphasize that conformity is
not necessary for convergence. Examples of convergence which include counter-conforming
agents were already given in the two-agent case (Section 3). In order to analyze necessary
23

Indeed, since x(t) = M t x(0), true opinions x(t) converge for arbitrary starting opinions x(0) if and
only if M t convergences. Moreover, it is easy to show that stated opinions s(t), as well as perceived
opinions q(t), converge if and only if true opinions converge (cf. Lemma A.2 in Appendix A.2).
24
Negative entries of M are not only remarkable because of the different dynamics they induce, but
also because of their interpretation as a negative relation between two agents: Although only positive
weights are put on each other’s opinions, an agent may negatively incorporate a peer’s opinion due to
counter-conformity.
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and sufficient conditions for convergence, the block structure of matrix M has to be
inspected. As we will see later, the block structure also determines which subgroups of
the society reach a consensus in the long run. In the standard model, agents within
a closed and strongly connected group, which corresponds to a block in the matrix G,
reach a consensus (e.g. DeMarzo et al., 2003; Golub and Jackson, 2010). Accordingly, we
partition the set of agents N with respect to the paths in the network as follows.
Definition 1. Let Π(N , G) = {C1 , C2 , ..., CK , R} be a partition of N into K(≥ 1) groups
and the (possibly empty) rest of the world R such that:
• Each group Ck is strongly connected, i.e. for all i, j ∈ Ck there exists l ∈ N such that
(Gl )ij > 0.
• Each group Ck is closed, i.e. for all i ∈ Ck , Gij > 0 implies j ∈ Ck .
• The (possibly empty) rest of the world consists of the agents who do not belong to
K
S
Ck .
any closed and strongly connected set, i.e. R = N \
k=1

With a suitable renumeration, the matrix G is organized into blocks which correspond
to the groups of the partition Π(N , G):





G=




G11
0
..
.

0 ···
.. ..
.
.
.. ..
.
.

···
..

.

0 · · · 0 GKK
GR1 · · · · · · GRK


0
.. 
. 

.. 
. 


0 
GRR

(10)

with Gkk = G|Ck , GRR = G|R , and GRk consisting of the rows of G belonging to R and
the columns of G belonging to Ck .
Intuitively, convergence of opinions requires that dynamics in each part of the network
settle down. Formally, Proposition A.1 in Appendix A.2 explicitly determines M – and
in fact M t , for all t ∈ N – showing that the structure of the society extends from the
standard model to our more general set-up.25 This means that the opinion dynamics of
each group Ck can be studied independently, while only for agents in R multiple groups
may matter. Thus, for convergence of opinions it is necessary that dynamics within each
group converge, as it is the case in the classic model. In contrast to the classic model,
however, this is not sufficient, as the following example shows.
25

This result is not self-evident. It crucially depends on the definition of the reference opinion qiτ (t).
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0.7
0.3
0
0


 0.3

0.7
0
0

Example 1. Suppose there are four agents such that G = 
0.085 0.085 0.49 0.34 .


0.085 0.085 0.34 0.49
Players 1 and 2 form a closed and strongly connected group C1 , while Players 3 and 4 from
the rest of the world R. Let the conformity parameter δ be given by δ = (0, 0, δROT W , δROT W ).
Figure 3 shows the opinion dynamics for the cases δROT W = −.75 and δROT W = −.9.
While convergence within the closed and strongly connected group is guaranteed, the rest
of the world (ROTW) may cause divergence of M t for t → ∞.26
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Figure 3: The opinion dynamics of Example 1 for (a) δROT W = −.75 and (b) δROT W = −.9.
Thus, convergence of opinions in all closed and strongly connected groups is not sufficient for convergence of opinions in the societey. In Proposition 3, we identify the
additional condition on the rest of the world such that M t converges.
Proposition 3 (Second Convergence Result). Let the block structure of M be given as
t
in (10). M t converges for t → ∞ if and only if Mkk
converges for all k = 1, . . . , K and
t
MRR converges to 0.
Proposition 3 presents a necessary and sufficient condition for convergence of M in
terms of the block structure. In Example 1 the condition that MRR converges to 0 fails
26

Notice
that, for the latter case, M not only hasnegative entries but also entries larger than unity:

0.7
0.3
0
0
 0.3

0.7
0
0

.
M =
0.053125 0.053125 −0.115625 1.009375 
0.053125 0.053125 1.009375 −0.115625
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since strong counter-conformity of two agents leads to eigenvalues with high absolute
value to the extent that |λRR | > 1, for some eigenvalue of MRR . A similar violation of the
necessary condition for convergence occurs if counter-conformity of agents in the closed
and strongly connected groups is too strong.
While tight convergence conditions for each block of matrix M are known, it is difficult
to trace these conditions back to the model fundamentals, which are the network G and
the distribution of conformity ∆. Already in the case of two agents, such conditions are
relatively complex (cf. (9)). For every numerical example, however, it is an easy computational exercise to determine M and M t and thereby establish the dynamic properties
including whether opinions converge or not. Therefore, we now assume for the remainder,
that the power series M t converges. Notice that this does not preclude the presence of
counter-conforming agents.

4.2

Long-run Opinions

Having established convergence, we now address where opinions converge to (in the long
run) when starting with some opinion profile x(0). It turns out that true, stated, and
perceived opinions always converge to the same limit, i.e. x(∞) = s(∞) = q(∞), as we
formally show by Lemma A.2 in Appendix A.2. Therefore, we can restrict our analysis
of the long run to the dynamics of true opinions. We are particularly interested in the
influence of each agent’s initial opinion on the long-run opinion given her position in the
network G and her degree of conformity δi . The following result characterizes the long-run
opinions explicitly (conditional on convergence). We present it first in a formal way and
turn to its interpretation with respect to opinion leadership in Section 4.3.
Theorem 1. Let G and M be organized as in (10). We denote by w, v ∈ Rn the vectors
that fulfill the following: for each closed and strongly connected group Ck ∈ Π(N , G), w|Ck
P
is the left unit eigenvector of Gkk with
wi = 1, while v|Ck is left unit eigenvector of
i∈C
k
P
Mkk with
wi = 1. If M t converges for t → ∞ to some matrix M ∞ , then the following
i∈Ck

holds:



M

∞





=




∞
M11

0
..
.

0 ···
.. ..
.
.
.. ..
.
.

0
··· 0
∞
MR1 · · · · · ·

with
∞
0
0
Mkk
= 1|Ck v|C
= 1|Ck w|C
k
k

1

···
..

.

∞
MKK
∞
MRK


0
.. 
.

.. 
.


0
0

I − ∆kk
,
− ∆kk )w|Ck

0
|Ck (I

(11)
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and
∞
∞
MRk
= (I − GRR )−1 GRk Mkk

(12)

for all k = 1, . . . , K.
Theorem 1 fully characterizes the long-run dynamics of (true) opinions given convergence since x(∞) = M ∞ x(0).27 For the interpretation of the result, we distinguish
between the closed and strongly connected groups Ck and the rest of the world R.
We can first observe that the long-run opinions may differ across groups, but each
t
closed and strongly connected group Ck reaches a consensus ck ∈ R as each block Mkk
∞
is given by the left-hand unit
of M t converges to a matrix of rank 1. Each row of Mkk
0
eigenvector v|C
, implying
k
0
x(0)|Ck
ck := xi (∞) = xj (∞) = v|C
k

(13)

0
for all agents i, j in group Ck . The left-hand normalized unit eigenvector v|C
thus displays
k
the extent to which the initial opinion of each agent i matters for consensus within group
0
0
Ck . Moreover, v|C
is a function of w|C
, the left-hand unit eigenvector of Gkk , and the
K
k
conformity parameters within the group, ∆kk . (We delay the interpretation of this result
and its comparative statics to the next subsection.)
The long-run opinion of an agent in R is simply some weighted average of the long-run
opinions c1 , . . . , cK within the groups 1, ..., K.28 To see this, consider the matrix

Γ := (I − GRR )−1 (GR1 1|C1 , . . . , GRK 1|CK ),
which is easily seen to be row-stochastic. Γ enables translating (12) into
x(∞)|R = Γc

(14)

combining the long-run opinions of the closed and strongly connected groups denoted by
the K-dimensional vector c = (c1 , . . ., cK )0 . Thus, the initial opinion of some agent in
the ROTW does not affect the long-run opinion profile x(∞) since the ROTW agents
end up with a weighted average of the consensus opinions of the closed and strongly
connected groups, which in turn are dependent on the initial opinions within those groups.
Moreover, the weights of averaging depend on G but not on the conformity parameters δi
for i ∈ R. Consequently, the long-run opinion of an agent in the ROTW neither depends
on an initial opinion nor on the conformity parameter of any agent within the ROTW
(including herself). Thus, the only way conformity of agents in the rest of the world
27

The dynamics collapse to the well-known DeGroot dynamics if every agent i is honest, i.e. ∆ is a
matrix of zeros.
28
This result is fully analogous to theorem 10 in DeMarzo et al. (2003).
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can affect long-run opinions is to induce divergence such as in Example 1. Since each
agent in the ROTW may average differently between consent opinions of the closed and
strongly connected groups, the agents in the ROTW need not reach a consensus if there
is more than just one closed and strongly connected group. The important contribution
of Theorem 1 lies in the characterization of v as a function of w and ∆, as we will discuss
next.

4.3

Opinion Leadership

To simplify the discussion, let us now restrict attention to one closed and strongly connected group by assuming that there is only one such group, i.e. Π(N , G) = N . For
this purpose it is sufficient to assume that G is strongly connected or, equivalently, that
rk(I − G) = n − 1, where rk yields the rank of a matrix.
P
From (13), we get that x(∞) = 1v 0 x(0) and hence xj (∞) = v 0 x(0) = i∈N vi xi (0).
Thus, an entry vi of v determines the weight of the initial opinion of agent i on the
long-run consensus opinion. This is a very intuitive formalization of opinion leadership:
v measures the power of each agent.
Note that for δi = 0 for all i ∈ N , (11) yields v = w, i.e. opinion leadership is fully
determined by the left-hand unit eigenvector of G. w is a well-studied object in network
science: it is known as eigenvector centrality (Bonacich, 1972; Friedkin, 1991).29 Relaxing
the assumption that every agent is honest, the following corollary of Theorem 1 shows
how opinion leadership is not only determined by eigenvector centrality, but also by the
degree of conformity.
Corollary 1. Let rk(I − G) = n − 1. Let w and v be the normalized left-hand unit
eigenvectors of G and M , respectively. Then we have for any i ∈ N
vi = P

(1 − δi )wi
.
j∈N (1 − δj )wj

(15)

Moreover,

∂vi
= P
n
∂δk



 wi (1 − δi )

wk

=
−
1
(vi − 1i=k ) .
i=k
n
n
P

P
wj (1 − δj )
wj (1 − δj )
wj (1 − δj )
wk

j=1

j=1

(16)

j=1

As it becomes apparent from (15) opinion leadership (power) vi of some agent i is
determined by the combination of her network centrality in G (wi ) and the individual
This index of centrality in a social network is recurrently defined via the rows of G0 (i.e. via the
columns of G): An agent’s centrality is the weighted sum of centralities of the agents who listen to her.
29
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conformity δi divided by the sum of these values over all agents. Thus, there is a complementary relationship between network centrality and 1 − δi : power becomes minimal
(vi → 0) if either i’s network centrality approaches zero or if i is fully conform (δi → 1).
Taking the network G as given, we can observe the comparative statics with respect to
δi . From (16) we get for all i ∈ N that opinion leadership is decreasing in own conformity
δi and increasing in other agents’ conformity δk , k 6= i, since wj ∈ [0, 1] and 1 − δj ≥ 0
for all j ∈ N . Thus, low own conformity fosters opinion leadership. The same is true if
other agents are more conforming. We also may use (16) to examine which agent’s power
changes most in response to a marginal increase in her own conformity. From (16), we
calculate that
∂vj
∂vi
<
∂δi
∂δj

⇔

wj2 (1

− δj ) −

wi2 (1

− δi ) < (wj − wi )

n
X

wk (1 − δk ).

(17)

k=1

Thus, if two agents have the same network centrality wi = wj , then by (17),

∂vi
∂δi

<

∂vj
∂δj

if and only if δi < δj . In other words, the agent with the already higher degree
of conformity and thus lower power loses even more power in response to a marginal
increase in conformity compared with an agent with low conformity. Holding δi = δj ,
∂v
i
we get ∂v
< ∂δjj if and only if wi < wj , which implies that for two agents with equal
∂δi
conformity the agent with the higher network centrality loses more power when increasing
own conformity.
We can also use Corollary 1 to compare opinion leadership in our model, v, with
opinion leadership in the classic DeGroot model, w, (i.e. with the special case of our
model where every agent i is honest, δi = 0). For this purpose consider first a society
where all agents are characterized by the same trait, i.e. δj = δ̄ for all j ∈ N . Then
(15) yields v = w: opinion leadership is not affected by conformity when all agents are
characterized by the same level of conformity. More generally, we have vi ≥ wi if and only
P
w
if δi ≤ j6=i P j wk δj , i.e. an agent’s power in our model compared to the classic DeGroot
k6=i
model is fostered if δi is below some average of the others’ conformity parameters.
This is illustrated in Figure 4 which depicts power vi as a function of conformity δi in
a variation of Example 1. We fixed δ1 = −0.7 and study the comparative-static effect of
Player 2’s conformity level δ2 on her power v2 . If Player 2 is honest, her initial opinion’s
impact on the long-run consensus is approximately 0.37, it completely vanishes for conformity level δ2 approaching 1, while counter-conformity allows Player 2 to “become” more
important in a comparative-static sense. One can show generally that the power gain by
counter-conforming is bounded by vi (δi ) ≤ (2 − wi )vi (0). In this example, it is further
bounded by the fact that too strong counter-conformity (δ2 ≤ −0.7) leads to divergence
of opinions.
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Figure 4: Power as a function of own conformity level.

5

Wisdom

The discussion so far applies to any continuous opinion including those for which no true
value can be determined. In some applications, however, agents’ opinions are more or less
accurate with respect to some objective truth. As in the discrete context of Condorcet’s
Jury theorem, the question whether agents aggregate information in an efficient way is
also of interest in the context of continuous opinions (Golub and Jackson, 2010; Acemoglu
et al., 2010).
Therefore we assume that there is some true value µ ∈ R and that all agents of
the society receive independent unbiased signals about µ with individual precision (i.e.
inverse of the variance) which constitute the agents’ initial opinions. Formally, for all
i ∈ N , agent i’s initial opinion xi (0) is a random variable with expected value µ and some
individual variance σi2 , and all xi (0) are uncorrelated random variables. Assuming that
opinion dynamics converge, a natural question to ask is how close the different steady
state opinions will be to the true, but to the agents unknown, value µ.30 To measure this
difference between µ and an estimate µ̂, we use the mean squared error (MSE), which is
defined as E((µ̂ − µ)2 ).31 The MSE can be decomposed into the squared bias (E(µ̂ − µ))2
and the estimator’s variance Var(µ̂):
E((µ̂ − µ)2 ) = (E(µ̂ − µ))2 + Var(µ̂).
30

Recall that in a steady state true opinions and stated opinions coincide and there is consensus within
groups.
31
The mean squared error as a measure of wisdom has also been used by Rauhut and Lorenz (2010).
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Figure 5: Network for wisdom example. This society consists of three closed and strongly
connected groups of size two and four agents in the rest of the world.

As x(∞) = M ∞ x(0) and M ∞ 1 = 1, it is obvious that E(x(∞)) = µ1, i.e. all agents’
long-run opinions are unbiased estimates for µ. Denoting by Σ the covariance matrix
of x(0), the corresponding MSEs are therefore given by the entries on the diagonal of
M ∞ Σ(M ∞ )0 . To study the effects of conformity on wisdom, we begin with an illustrative
example.

5.1

Wisdom: an Example

2
Let n = 10, (σ12 , . . . , σ10
)=(6, 4, 8, 7, 6, 3, 10, 12, 14, 16), and




0.9 0.1 0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0


0.4 0.6 0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0


0
0 0.8 0.2 0
0
0
0
0
0




0

0
0.3
0.7
0
0
0
0
0
0


0
0
0
0 0.7 0.3 0
0
0
0


G=
.
0

0
0
0
0.3
0.7
0
0
0
0


0.1 0
0
0
0
0 0.9 0
0
0




0

0
0.2
0.3
0
0
0
0.5
0
0


0.1 0
0 0.1 0
0
0
0 0.8 0 


0
0
0
0
0 0.2 0
0 0.2 0.6
In this situation, we have K = 3 closed and strongly connected groups, C1 = {1, 2},
C2 = {3, 4}, and C3 = {5, 6}, while Players 7 to 10 form the rest of the world, as also
illustrated in Figure 5. If all agents report their opinions truthfully (∆ = 0), we find
the MSEs equal to (4, 4, 4, 4, 2.25, 2.25, 4, 4, 2, 1.0625). There are several notable
features of this observation. First, due to the fact that their long-run opinions are equal,
all agents within a given closed and strongly connected group share the same level of
wisdom. Comparing the first two groups, we note that the MSEs of these two groups are
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4 each, although the first group enjoys significantly better initial signals (of variances 6
and 4), while the second group seems to combine their less precise signals (of variances 8
and 7) much more effectively. It is also remarkable that Player 2, by communicating with
Player 1, ends up with exactly the same MSE of 4 that she would reach if she used only
her own signal. With respect to the rest of the world, notice that these agents typically
have different MSEs. Furthermore, Players 7 and 8 each end up with the same MSE as
the first two groups, while Players 9 and 10 achieve MSEs better than all members of the
closed and strongly connected groups.
Now suppose that Players 2, 3, and 5 are conforming with δ2 = 5/9, δ3 = 2/3, and
δ5 = 1/2 (and δi = 0 for all other players). Then wisdom levels can be calculated to be
(4.9, 4.9, 4, 4, 2, 2, 4.9, 4, 2.225, 1.05625). Thus, increasing conformity can lead to a
decrease in wisdom (as the first group’s MSE becomes larger), the same wisdom (as the
second group’s MSE does not change), or an increase in wisdom (as the third group’s
MSE becomes smaller). We also find that the agents in the rest of the world are affected
by the changes in conformity of the agents in the closed and strongly connected groups:
the MSE of Players 7 and 9 increases, while Player 10’s MSE decreases slightly. It still
holds that Player 7 and 8’s MSEs equal that of the first and second group, respectively.
We will now proceed by systematically analyzing the principles underlying the distribution of wisdom within the society.

5.2

Wisdom of Groups

Due to (13), a group Ck will, given convergence, eventually end up reaching a consensus
0
x(0)|Ck =: µ̂k . Hence, we can directly
where all agents’ opinions are equal to ck = v|C
k
derive group Ck ’s wisdom as the MSE of µ̂k .
Lemma 1. The MSE of µ̂k is given by
2


MSEk := E((µ̂k − µ)2 ) =

X

vi2 σi2 =

i∈Ck

X  (1 − δi )wi 
2
 σi .
P
(1 − δj )wj
i∈C
k

j∈Ck

We may use Lemma 1 to identify the individual contributions to the MSE in a given
group Ck . First, from Lemma 1 it follows directly that
MSEk =

X
i∈Ck

vi2 σi2 ≤

X
i∈Ck

vi σi2 ≤ max σi2 ,
i∈Ck

(18)

since vi2 ≤ vi due to vi ∈ (0, 1] for all agents i. Thus, group Ck ’s long-run opinion is on
average at least as close to the true value µ as that of the agent with the least precise
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signal. This worst case is given when both inequalities in (18) become equalities, which
is the case for vi ∈ {0, 1} for all i ∈ Ck (first inequality) and vi = 0 for all i with
σi2 < max σj2 (second inequality). Therefore, information updating within group Ck is
j∈Ck

worst when importance is given to only one agent whose signal is most imprecise. This
case would be approached if all other agents were close to full conformity, i.e. δi close to
1. We now consider the comparative static effect of one agent’s conformity on the wisdom
of her group.
Proposition 4. The wisdom of a closed and strongly connected group Ck is increasing in
the conformity level of a group member i if and only if i0 s product of signal variance and
power is larger than the group’s MSE, i.e.
∂ MSEk
≤ 0 ⇔ vi σi2 ≥ MSEk .
∂δi

P

vi
To give an interpretation for Proposition 4, let us rewrite vi σi2 = 1/σ
2 and MSEk =
i
vj
vj 1/σ2 . This shows that it is not a person’s expertise alone which is decisive for the

j∈Ck

j

question of how this person can increase the group’s wisdom, rather, it is the ratio of power
vi
over signal precision, 1/σ
2 : if agents with a high ratio as compared to the group’s average
i
are more conforming, then this will reduce their power within the group, decrease the
group’s MSE, and thereby increase its wisdom. Vice versa, agents who are not powerful
enough in relation to their signal precision will increase the group’s wisdom if they are
less conforming, because this will increase their power, decrease the group’s MSE, and
foster its wisdom.32
The above discussion implies that in the best possible case, the ratio of power over
signal precision is constant within a group: vi σi2 = vj σj2 for all i, j ∈ Ck . This is formalized
in the following corollary of Proposition 4.
Corollary 2. For the wisdom of group Ck as measured by MSEk , we have
1
MSEk ≥ P
j∈Ck

1
σj2

=: MSE∗k ,

(19)

with equality in (19) if and only if vi σi2 = vj σj2 for all i, j ∈ Ck . The latter condition is
equivalent to
1
δi = 1 − a 2 P 1 for all i ∈ Ck
(20)
σi wi
σ2
j∈Ck

for some constant a ∈ (0, 2

j

1
min wj σj2 ).
σj2 j∈C
k
j∈Ck

P

32

An analogous discussion can be already found in DeMarzo et al. (2003) for the case where agents are
honest.
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Corollary 2 delivers the analogue to (18). While (18) describes the worst case with
respect to wisdom, Corollary 2 considers the best scenario: all agents within the same
closed and strongly connected group share the same ratio of power over signal precision,
and this case can always be constructed if the agents’ conformity is distributed suitably.
P 1
min wj σj2 ] in (20) ensures δi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ Ck
In particular, choosing a ∈ (0,
σ2
j∈Ck

j

j∈Ck

and therefore by Proposition 2 guarantees convergence of the opinions in Ck to the best
possible consensus µ̂k . Notice also that the optimal MSE is smaller than individual signal
variance σi2 for all agents i in group Ck , as is easily seen from (19). Therefore, under
optimal conformity all agents within Ck benefit from communication.
Reconsidering the example discussed in Subsection 5.1, we find the network centralities
(the left-hand unit eigenvectors of G) to be w1 = 0.8, w2 = 0.2, w3 = 0.6, w4 = 0.4,
w5 = 0.5, and w6 = 0.4. Therefore, in (20) the constant a can be chosen in (0, 2/3)
(group 1) and (0, 3/2) (groups 2 and 3). Choosing a = 1/3 (group 1) and a = 3/4 (groups
2 and 3) delivers δ1 = 5/6, δ3 = 5/12, and δ5 = 1/2 (and δi = 0 for all other agents).
Thus, choosing the agents’ degrees of conformity according to these values ensures the
optimal wisdom within the respective groups, given by (2.4, 2.4, 3.73, 3.73, 2, 2, 2.4,
3.73, 1.53, 0.883). The same level could also be reached for other conformity levels, for
instance, choosing a = 1/4 (first group), a = 3/7 (second group), and a = 3/8 (third
group) in (20), we find that the conformity levels δ1:6 = (7/8, 1/4, 2/3, 3/7, 3/4, 1/2)
also lead to the optimal wisdom. Notice that, as in Golub and Jackson (2010), wisdom
thus is independent of the speed of convergence, as we have two examples with the same
optimal wisdom but different speeds of convergence (the last-mentioned conformity levels
lead to slightly slower convergence than the earlier mentioned ones).

5.3

Wisdom within the Rest of the World

Let us recall that agents in the rest of the world do not necessarily share a consensus
opinion in the long run, so that we will typically have individual wisdom levels. Due
to (14), we have the following formula for the long-run opinions within the rest of the
world: x(∞)|R = Γµ̂, with µ̂ := (µ̂1 , . . . , µ̂K )0 . Therefore, the wisdom levels in the rest
of the world depend on the conformity levels of the agents in the closed and strongly
connected groups as these affect the consensus opinions µ̂k of these groups. On the other
hand, as neither the initial signals nor the conformity levels of the agents in the rest of
the world play any role for their long-run opinions, these agents’ wisdom is independent
of their conformity levels as well as of their initial signals. In other words, if the rest
of the world is non-empty, information processing in the society is necessarily inefficient
as the information contained in these agents’ initial signals is inevitably lost. Assuming
convergence, let γi,k denote the long-term weight of the group Ck on the opinion of agent

26
http://services.bepress.com/feem/paper914

26

Buechel et al.: Opinion Dynamics and Wisdom under Conformity

i ∈ R, i.e. xi (∞) =

K
P

γi,k µ̂k (cf. (14)). This immediately translates into the wisdom of

k=1

an agent i ∈ R as follows:
E((xi (∞) − µ)2 ) =

K
X

2
γi,k
MSEk ≤ max MSEk .
k=1,...,K

k=1

(21)

The wisdom of an agent in the rest of the world depends on the wisdom within the closed
and strongly connected groups. More precisely, an agent i’s wisdom only depends on the
wisdom of groups Ck to which there is a directed path in the network G because this
corresponds to γi,k > 0. The worst case for an agent in the rest of the world is to be
influenced only by agents of one closed and strongly connected group with maximal MSE.
With regard to the example discussed in subsection 5.1 this is the case for Players 7 and 8
who have directed paths only into group 1 and group 2, respectively, such that they share
their MSEs of 4 (cf. Figure 5). Player 9, however, who has directed paths into both groups
with MSE of 4 reaches an MSE of 2 since the long-term weights γ9,1 = 0.5 and γ9,2 = 0.5
are squared in (21). Finally, Player 10 has directed paths into these groups via Player 9
and, moreover, has a directed path into group 3. Player 10 therefore is able to combine
MSEs of 4, 4, and 2.25 into an MSE as low as 1.0625. It is intuitive that for maximal
wisdom of an agent in the rest of the world, all groups’ signals have to be accessed with
some kind of balanced group weights. The following proposition confirms this intuition.
Proposition 5. For agents i ∈ R, we have:
E((xi (∞) − µ)2 ) ≥

1
K
P
k=1

with equality if and only if γi,k =
MSEk

1
K
P

,

(22)

1
MSEk

for all k = 1, . . . , K.

1
MSEl
l=1

Therefore, the highest wisdom is achieved if an agent in the rest of the world averages
the different groups’ opinions in such a way that the product of weight put on a group
and its MSE is constant for all groups: the better a group’s estimate, the more weight it
should get. Nevertheless, as all the optimal weights are positive, this optimum can only be
achieved if from agent i there is a directed path into all the closed and strongly connected
groups. Notice also that the optimal weights depend on the groups’ MSEs such that an
agent in the rest of the world who is initially characterized by optimal weights would no
longer average the groups’ opinions optimally if conformity levels within the groups were
to change.
It is remarkable that an agent in the rest of the world who is connected to multiple
groups can reach a significantly lower MSE than the best informed agents from those
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groups. Thus, the fact that agents in the rest of the world are absolutely powerless does
not imply that they are not wise.

6

Concluding Remarks

So far, the literature on opinion dynamics has focused on truthful opinion representation
either with a Bayesian approach (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhchandani et al., 1992; Smith and
Sorensen, 2000; Gale and Kariv, 2003; Acemoglu et al., 2011) or assuming naı̈ve updating
according to a learning matrix (DeGroot, 1974; DeMarzo et al., 2003; Golub and Jackson,
2010; Acemoglu et al., 2010). Despite some disputable assumptions in both approaches,
as Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2011) point out, these models serve well to study conditions
under which societies will eventually reach a state of agreement, i.e. consensus. Moreover,
in both contexts the aggregation of initial opinions may, but need not, be “asymptotically
efficient,” in the sense that social learning leads to a high accuracy of information in the
long run. One basic force fostering efficient information aggregation even among naı̈ve
agents is a statistical effect of growing sample size (which is also called “the wisdom of
crowds”) such as in Condorcet’s Jury Theorem. On the other hand, prominent agents
or opinion leaders might reduce the accuracy of information aggregation by superseding
valuable opinions of others.
To our best knowledge, this paper is the first contribution to incorporate misrepresentation of opinions among naı̈ve agents. We assume that individuals depart from their
true opinion by conforming or counter-conforming with their peer group which is a well
documented phenomenon (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955; Jones, 1984; Zafar, 2011). While
we follow the literature based on DeGroot (1974) in modeling informational social influence as naı̈ve updating of opinions through the network, we, thus, also model normative
social influence by including conforming/counter-conforming behavior. In order to study
the effects of conformity on long-run opinions and information aggregation, we characterize sufficient conditions for convergence and characterize the long-run opinions in this
dynamic framework. When all agents are conforming or honest, then opinions converge
(Proposition 2).
Assuming convergence, we then characterize the long-run (consensus) opinion in each
closed and strongly connected group under conformity (Theorem 1). Thereby, we are in
a position to study the impact of the individual levels of conformity on opinion leadership and on wisdom of the society. Opinion leaders are those whose initial opinion has a
high impact on consensus. We find that this influence is increasing in network centrality
(as in the DeGroot model), but moreover decreasing in the individual level of conformity (Corollary 1). Thus, taking the network as given, we conclude that low conformity
fosters opinion leadership while high conformity undermines opinion leadership. This re-
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sult is fully in line with empirical evidence that opinion leaders are characterized by a
higher inclination to “publicly individuate” themselves (Chan and Misra, 1990). Therefore, counter-conformity might be interpreted as a persuasion device since not only the
connected agents’ opinions of next period are swayed towards own opinion but a higher
impact on the consensus opinion is achieved.
The effect of heterogeneous levels of conformity on wisdom of the society is ambiguous.
Here, wisdom is defined as the mean squared error (MSE) of the consensus opinion where
agents’ initial opinions are noisy but unbiased signals about some true state of the world
with heterogeneous signal precision. Increasing conformity of a given individual need not
undermine the wisdom of the society, but can also enhance it or leave it unchanged. We
find that increasing conformity of agents with high power and low signal precision increases
the group’s wisdom (Proposition 4). In particular, optimal wisdom within a given closed
and strongly connected group is achieved if distribution of conformity levels is such that
ratio of power over signal precision is balanced across agents (Corollary 2). This result
resembles the fact that reducing prominence of individuals – in particular prominence
of uninformed agents – increases the accuracy of information aggregation. While in the
previous literature reduction of prominence is achieved by increasing population size (see
e.g. Golub and Jackson, 2010), in our model this can be achieved by conformity and
therefore also holds for small groups. Finally, when considering agents in the rest of the
world, we find that their levels of conformity have no influence on wisdom. Although
powerless, individuals in the rest of the world can be quite wise since they may aggregate
information from different groups.
The model presented here contains some simplifying assumptions which may be relaxed
in future research. First, we assumed that the social network is exogenous and stays
fixed over time. In the literature we can find models where the network structure may
vary over time such that only agents with “close opinions” are listened to (Hegselmann
and Krause, 2002), self-confidence varies (DeMarzo et al., 2003), and general changes
are possible (Lorenz, 2005). It would be interesting to see how changes in the learning
structure, either exogenously or endogenously, affect our results. Second, we assumed
that interaction neighborhood equals observation neighborhood in the sense that agents
conform or counter-conform with those agents they listen to. If this assumption is relaxed,
the group structure may no longer be preserved and interesting applications to lobbying
(addressing a certain group) become possible. We leave these ideas and possible other
extensions to future research.
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A
A.1

Mathematical Appendix
Expressed Opinions

Proof of Proposition 1
First, notice that s(t) by construction satisfies s(t) = (I − ∆)x(t) + ∆Y s(t) with
Y := (I − D)−1 (G − D) and that for all i ∈ Aτ (t), sτi (t) is the i-th component of
(I − ∆)x(t) + ∆Y sτ −1 (t). For all i ∈ Aτ (t), we therefore find sτi (t) − si (t) as the ith component of ∆Y (sτ −1 (t) − s(t)). As Y is obviously a row-stochastic matrix, we
immediately have |sτi (t) − si (t)| ≤ δ ∗ ||sτ −1 (t) − s(t)||∞ for all i ∈ Aτ (t), with δ ∗ :=
max |δi | < 1, while we have |sτi (t) − si (t)| = |sτi −1 (t) − si (t)| ≤ ||sτ −1 (t) − s(t)||∞ for all
i∈N

i 6∈ Aτ (t). Together, we therefore have that ||sτ (t) − s(t)||∞ ≤ ||sτ −1 (t) − s(t)||∞ for all
τ , showing that the distance between sτ (t) and s(t) measured using the || · ||∞ -norm is a
non-increasing and therefore converging sequence.
Now, let Ui (t) := {τ ∈ N : i ∈ Aτ (t)}, for each agent i. Using the assumption that
every agent i belongs almost surely to infinitely many Aτ (t), we define τ1 := min{τ ∈
N : (∀i ∈ N )(Ui (t) ∩ {1, . . . , τ } =
6 ∅)} as the first time-step where every agent has at
least once been satisfied with her stated opinion.33 Given the above, it is easy to see that
||sτ1 (t) − s(t)||∞ ≤ δ ∗ ||s0 (t) − s(t)||∞ . Proceeding in the same way by recursively defining
τk+1 := min{τ > τk : (∀i ∈ N )(Ui (t) ∩ {τk + 1, . . . , τ } =
6 ∅)} as the first time-step after τk
such that all agents have at least been once satisfied with their stated opinion, we then
have ||sτk (t) − s(t)||∞ ≤ (δ ∗ )k ||s0 (t) − s(t)||∞ , yielding that ||sτk (t) − s(t)||∞ and therefore
also ||sτ (t) − s(t)||∞ converges to 0.

A.2

Convergence

To prove Proposition 2 the following lemma is helpful.
−1

Lemma A.1 (I-M). I − M = (I − (G − D)∆(I − D)−1 )

(I − G).

Proof of Lemma A.1 (I-M)
First, we can rewrite M , given by (6), to obtain
M = G − (G − D)(I − ∆(I − D)−1 (G − D))−1 ∆(I − (I − D)−1 (G − D)).
33

The assumption that all Ui (t) are almost surely infinite guarantees that τ1 , τ2 , . . . are almost surely
well-defined.
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This can be verified by the following calculation.
M = D + (G − D)(I − ∆(I − D)−1 (G − D))−1 (I − ∆)

−1 
= D + (G − D) I − ∆(I − D)−1 (G − D)
I − ∆(I − D)−1 (G − D)

+ ∆(I − D)−1 (G − D) − ∆

−1 

= D + (G − D)(I + I − ∆(I − D)−1 (G − D)
∆(I − D)−1 (G − D) − ∆)

−1 

= G − (G − D) I − ∆(I − D)−1 (G − D) ∆ I − (I − D)−1 (G − D) .
Thus,

−1
I − M = I − G + (G − D) I − ∆(I − D)−1 (G − D) ∆(I − D)−1 (I − G)



−1
= I + (G − D) I − ∆(I − D)−1 (G − D)
∆(I − D)−1 (I − G).

(A.1)

Now, note that for any n × m-matrix A and any m × n-matrix B, with Ik the kdimensional identity matrix (k ∈ {n, m}), we have that In − AB is invertible if and
only if Im − BA is invertible, and then (In − AB)−1 = In + A(Im − BA)−1 B, since
(In + A(Im − BA)−1 B)(In − AB) = In − AB + A(Im − BA)−1 B − A(Im − BA)−1 BAB =
In − AB + A(Im − BA)−1 (Im − BA)B = In . Taking A = G − D and B = ∆(I − D)−1 in
−1
(A.1) then gives I − M = (I − (G − D)∆(I − D)−1 ) (I − G).
Proof of Proposition 2
Denote Y := (I − D)−1 (G − D) which is row stochastic. Thus, as |δi | < 1 for all
P
k
i ∈ N , we have that I − ∆Y is invertible and (I − ∆Y )−1 = ∞
k=0 (∆Y ) . Moreover, if
P∞
δi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ N , the sum k=0 (∆Y )k is a sum of non-negative matrices, implying
that (I −∆Y )−1 has only non-negative entries. Hence M = D +(G−D)[I −∆Y ]−1 (I −∆)
is non-negative since it is the product of non-negative matrices (since 0 < gii < 1) added
to D, which is a diagonal matrix with strictly positive entries (0 < gii ). Finally, since
M 1 = 1 by Lemma A.1, we get that M is row stochastic. Since the diagonal of D is
strictly positive, we get that the diagonal of M is strictly positive, mii > 0, implying
aperiodicity of M . Thus M t converges.

Proposition A.1 (Blocks). Let G be given as in (10), i.e. organized into blocks according
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to the partition Π(N , G) = {C1 , C2 , ..., CK , R}. Then for every t = 1, 2, ... we have


t
M11

0 ···
... ...
... ...

···


 0


...
M t =  ...


t
··· 0
MKK
 0
(M t )R1 · · · · · · (M t )RK


0
.. 
. 

.. 
. 


0 
t
MRR

with
t
Mkk
= [I − I − (Gkk − Dkk )∆kk (I − Dkk )−1

−1

(I − Gkk )]t

for all k = 1, . . . , K, R, and
t

(M )Rk =

t−1
X

t−1−l
l
MRk Mkk
,
MRR

l=0

where MRk = (I − (GRR − DRR )∆RR (I − DRR )−1 )−1 GRk [(I − ∆kk (I − Dkk )−1 (Gkk −
Dkk ))−1 (I − ∆kk )] for all k = 1, . . . , K.
Proof of Proposition A.1
Let Z := [I −∆(I −D)−1 (G−D)]−1 (I −∆) to simplify s = Zx and M = D+(G−D)Z.
We now proceed in three steps: we first characterize Z, then M , and finally M t . Let G be
given as in (10). Then simple but tedious block matrix algebra together with Lemma A.1
yields:
1.






Z=




Z11
0
..
.

0 ···
.. ..
.
.
.. ..
.
.

···
..

.

0
..
.
..
.
0

0 · · · 0 ZKK
ZR1 · · · · · · ZRK ZRR











with
Zkk = (I − ∆kk (I − Dkk )−1 (Gkk − Dkk ))−1 (I − ∆kk ),
ZRk = ZRR (I − ∆RR )−1 ∆RR (I − DRR )−1 GRk Zkk
for all k = 1, . . . , K, and
ZRR = (I − ∆RR (I − DRR )−1 (GRR − DRR ))−1 (I − ∆RR ).
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−1

2. For M = D + (G − D)Z = I − (I − (G − D)∆(I − D)−1 )


M11

0 ···
... ...
... ...

···


 0


...
M =  ...


· · · 0 MKK
 0
MR1 · · · · · · MRK

(I − G), we get


0
.. 
. 

.. 
. 


0 
MRR

with
Mkk = Dkk + (Gkk − Dkk )(I − ∆kk (I − Dkk )−1 (Gkk − Dkk ))−1 (I − ∆kk )
−1
(I − Gkk ),
= I − I − (Gkk − Dkk )∆kk (I − Dkk )−1

MRk = GRk Zkk + (GRR − DRR )ZRk
= (I − (GRR − DRR )∆RR (I − DRR )−1 )−1 GRk Zkk
for all k = 1, . . . , K, and
MRR = DRR + (GRR − DRR )(I − ∆RR (I − DRR )−1 (GRR − DRR ))−1 (I − ∆RR )
−1
= I − I − (GRR − DRR )∆RR (I − DRR )−1
(I − GRR ).
3. Finally, we claim that for every t ∈ N \ {0},





Mt = 




with (M t )Rk =

t−1
P

t
M11

0
..
.

0 ···
... ...
... ...

···
...

t
0
··· 0
MKK
(M t )R1 · · · · · · (M t )RK


0
.. 
. 

.. 
. 


0 
t
MRR

t−1−l
l
MRR
MRk Mkk
for all k = 1, . . . , K.

l=0
t
t
t
The assertion for the diagonal elements M11
, . . . , MKK
and MRR
is trivial. We prove
t
the formula for MRk
by induction.

• For t = 1, the assertion is trivial.
t
• t 7→ t + 1: first, we have (M t+1 )Rk = (M t M )Rk = (M t )Rk Mkk + MRR
MRk
t−1
P
t−1−l
l
by simple matrix multiplication. Inserting (M t )Rk =
MRR
MRk Mkk
, we
l=0
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find
(M t+1 )Rk =
=

t−1
X
l=0
t+1−1
X

!
t−1−l
l
MRR
MRk Mkk

t
Mkk + MRR
MRk

t+1−1−l
l
MRR
MRk Mkk
,

l=0

which concludes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3
1. ‘Only if’: this is proven in the first part of the proof of Theorem 1.
t
t
t
conconverges and MRR
converges to 0. First, since Mkk
2. ‘If’: Suppose each Mkk
verges, its only eigenvalue with |λ| ≥ 1 is λ = 1 with algebraic and geometric
t
multiplicity equal to 1 for every k = 1, . . . , K. On the other hand, MRR
→ 0 implies that the eigenvalues of MRR are all smaller than 1 in absolute value and, thus,
MRR − λI is invertible for all complex numbers λ with |λ| ≥ 1.

Now, let the complex number λ̃ be either outside of the unit circle (|λ̃| > 1) or
exactly on the unit circle (|λ̃| = 1), but different from 1. Taking into account the
block structure of M , we easily see that any solution of (M − λ̃I)x = 0 must satisfy
x|C1 = 0, . . . , x|CK = 0, and therefore also x|CR = 0, so that we can conclude that
λ = 1 is the only possible eigenvalue of M with |λ| ≥ 1.
In order to show convergence of M t , we therefore have to show that algebraic and
geometric multiplicity of λ = 1 coincide. With regard to algebraic multiplicity, the
K
Q
det(Mkk − λI) det(MRR − λI), such
block structure of M implies det(M − λI) =
k=1

that the algebraic multiplicity of λ = 1 is the sum of the algebraic multiplicities
of M11 , . . . , MKK and MRR , which are given by 1 and 0, respectively, since Mkk
is by definition irreducible for all k = 1, ..., K. Consequently, the algebraic multiplicity equals K. With regard to geometric multiplicity, the block structure of M
implies that for any real numbers c1 , . . . , cK , the vector x of the form x|Ck = ck 1|Ck
n
P
(k = 1, . . . , K) and x|CR = (I − MRR )−1
ck MRk 1|Ck is an eigenvector to M for
k=1

λ = 1, implying that the geometric multiplicity is at least K, thereby concluding
the proof.

A.3

Long run

Lemma A.2. The following statements are equivalent:
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1. True opinions x(t) converge for t → ∞.
2. Stated opinions s(t) converge for t → ∞.
3. Perceived opinions q(t) converge for t → ∞.
Moreover, if the true, stated, and perceived opinions converge, then the limits coincide:
lim x(t) = lim s(t) = lim q(t).
t→∞

t→∞

t→∞

Proof of Lemma A.2
−1
From Proposition 1, we get that s(t) = (I − ∆(I − D)−1 (G − D)) (I − ∆)x(t). Thus
convergence of x(t) implies convergence of s(t). By definition we have that q(t) = (I −
D)−1 (G − D)s(t), and hence convergence of s(t) implies convergence of q(t). To see that
convergence of q(t) implies convergence of x(t), we use that x(t + 1) = Dx(t) + (G −
t−1
P t−1−l
D)s(t) = Dx(t) + (I − D)q(t). For all t ≥ 0, this implies x(t) = Dt x(0) +
D
(I −
l=0

D)q(l), the first part of which converges to 0 because all elements of the diagonal matrix
D belong to [0, 1). The limit of x(t) therefore equals
lim

t→∞

t−1
X

Dt−1−l (I − D)q(l) = lim

l=0

t→∞

t−1
X

Dt−1−l (I − D) (q(l) − q(∞))

l=0
t−1
X

+ lim

t→∞

Dt−1−l (I − D)q(∞).

l=0

First, note that the second limit equals q(∞), because

∞
P

Dl = (I − D)−1 . For the first

l=0

limit, note that for any ε > 0, we can find an index lε such that we have ||q(l)−q(∞)|| < ε
for all l > lε . Splitting the sum into small l (l ≤ lε ) and large l (l > lε ), we then
easily see that the first term converges to 0. Therefore, x(t) converges to q(∞). Since
s(t) = (I − ∆)x(t) + ∆q(t), s(t) also shares the same limit.

To prove Theorem 1, the following Lemma is helpful.
Lemma A.3 (Convergence to Eigenvector). Let A be an n × n-matrix with A1 = 1 and
rk(I − A) = n − 1. If At converges to A∞ for t → ∞, then A∞ = 1w0 , with w0 the unique
normalized left eigenvector of A associated with the eigenvalue 1.
Proof of Lemma A.3
Obviously, AA∞ = A∞ = A∞ A. This implies that
• the columns of A∞ must be multiples of 1,
• the rows of A∞ must be multiples of w0 ,
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from which we find A∞ = r 1w0 for some real number r which is found to be equal to 1
as 1 = A∞ 1 = r 1w0 1 = r 1.
Proof of Theorem 1
∞
∞
∞
.
. Then we will turn to MRR
and MRk
We first derive the formula for Mkk
Assume for the moment that rk(I − G) = n − 1. Then, as v 0 (M − I) = 0, we have due
to Lemma A.1
0 = v 0 (I − M ) = v 0 I − (G − D)∆(I − D)−1

−1

(I − G),

implying
v 0 I − (G − D)∆(I − D)−1

−1

= r w0

for some real number r. Using w0 G = w0 , we then find


v 0 = r w0 I − (G − D)∆(I − D)−1 = r w0 I − (I − D)∆(I − D)−1 = r w0 (I − ∆).
The normalization of v then entails r =

1
,
w0 (I−∆)1

which shows that v =

(I − ∆)w

10 (I − ∆)w

.

∞
Now, relaxing the assumption rk(I − G) = n − 1, the formula for Mkk
follows.

∞
∞
To determine the formulas for MRR
and MRk
, we first establish that GM ∞ = M ∞ .

−1
We have Gx = x ⇔ (I − G)x = 0 ⇔ I − (G − D)∆(I − D)−1 (I − G)x = 0, since


by Lemma A.1 I − (G − D)∆(I − D)−1 is invertible. Thus by Lemma A.1, Gx = x if
and only if M x = x. Furthermore, M M ∞ x = M ∞ x and therefore GM ∞ x = M ∞ x for all
n-dimensional vectors x, delivering GM ∞ = M ∞ . This implies
∞
∞
∞
∞
= 0 because
= GRR MRR
and therefore (I − GRR )MRR
= 0, entailing MRR
• MRR
I − GRR is invertible,
∞
∞
∞
∞
∞
• MRk
= GRk Mkk
+ GRR MRk
, and therefore MRk
= (I − GRR )−1 GRk Mkk
.

A.4

Wisdom

Proof of Lemma 1
P
First, µ̂k is easily seen to be unbiased for µ because
vi = 1. Therefore, its MSE
i∈Ck
P 2 2
equals its variance which is given by
vi σi as the xi (0) are uncorrelated.
i∈Ck

Proof of Proposition 4
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∂ MSEk
=
∂δi

∂

vj2 σj2

P
j∈Ck

=

∂δi

X

2σj2 vj

j∈Ck

X
∂vj (16)
2wi
= P
σj2 vj (vj − 1j=i ) .
∂δi
wj (1 − δj ) j∈C
k

j∈Ck

The assertion follows easily noting that MSEk =

P

vj vj σj2 .

j∈Ck
K
P

Proof of Proposition 5 First, notice that E((xi (∞) − µ)2 ) =

2
γi,k
MSEk , with

k=1
K
P

γi,k = 1 for all i ∈ R. By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, we have

k=1

1=

K
X

γi,k =

k=1

K 
X

γi,k

k=1

p
1
MSEk √
MSEk


v
v
uK
uK
uX
uX
2
≤t
γi,k
MSEk t
k=1

k=1

1
,
MSEk

with equality if and only if there exists some (necessarily positive) constant a such that
K
√
P
1
1
2
γi,k MSEk = a √MSE
γi,k
MSEk ≥ P
for
all
k.
We
therefore
have
, with equality
K
k
k=1

k=1

if and only if γi,k =
MSEk

1
K
P
l=1

1
MSEk

for all k.
1
MSEl
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